Enter your search terms
	Submit search form

By: Jagmohan

    Sensing what was to take place on and around January 26, I accelerated the pace of work. I met as many people as I could. I held as many discussions as possible with local officers. I opened my heart to the sincere and kept the 'quislings' at bay.
     I was left in no doubt that a diabolical plan of subversion had been worked out. The final blow had to be struck on January 26, which also happened to be a Friday. Collection of about a million people was planned at the Idgah. In the city, they would be exhorted, through the mosques' loudspeakers, to proceed to the Idgah in small batches. Simultaneously, hordes of people would move from the outlying areas. From the neighboring villages and small towns, the movement would be through buses and private vehicles. The 'namaz' would be performed with all the religious fervour. Slogans of independence would be raised. Shots would be fired in the air by the militants. Then, suddenly, the National Flag of the Union would be symbolically burnt and the flag of Islamic Republic hoisted. Foreign corespondents and photographers would be there in any number to report the event and take photographs.           
     The plotters had calculated that, being a Republic Day, the Government would have to allow free movement. And, judging by the past inaction, the organisers had convinced themselves that the Government would not interfere. The leaders and civil servants would be busy in Jammu, taking salute, and the local officers would not act. They could be made even to raise their hands as soon as the new flag went up. A few police officers would be there to lend a helping hand, if necessary.
     The schemers had made all the preparations. They had kept the plan a closely guarded secret and wanted to spring a surprise at the eleventh hour. The only calculations they had not made was that the Farooq Government was a longer there. As early as on August 14, 1989, the previous Government had virtually permitted the militants to take salute in a parade at the Islamia Collage. The new factor had come in. and this was my appointment. The organisers took this into account but somewhat late and, as it turned out later, somewhat imperfectly. They thought that, in the first instance, I would not know what the game was, and even if I got scent of the matter, I would not have time to work out counter-strategy and implement it successfully. In any case, what could I do? Call in the Army and had made all the preparations. They had kept the plan a closely guarded secret and wanted to spring a surprise at the eleventh hour. The only calculations they had not made was that the Farooq Government was a longer there. As early as on August 14, 1989, the previous Government had virtually permitted the militants to take salute in a parade at the Islamia Collage. The new factor had come in. and this was my appointment. The organisers took this into account but somewhat late and, as it turned out later, somewhat imperfectly. They thought that, in the first instance, I would not know what the game was, and even if I got scent of the matter, I would not have time to work out counter-strategy and implement it successfully. In any case, what could I do? Call in the Army and paramilitary forces, after hoisting of the new flag, to disperse one million people, make a Tienanmen Square or a Blue Star, and thus subserve the very purpose of the militants and their supporters across the border? And what could the Army do if one million people just decided to sit at the Idgah and refuse to move?
     In the meanwhile, I went ahead speedily to weld as many broken tools as possible and forge new ones to meet the challenge. A broad strategy had been thought of by me. And this was to attain maximum result with minimum casualties and in the shortest possible time.   
     To create and extremely critical situation one or two days before January 26, an absolutely false remour was spread, in accordance with pre-planned design, that four 'jawans' of the Kashmir Armed Police had been shot dead by the paramilitary forces. The agents provocateurs were simultaneously at work within the Armed Police and the local police stations. Some of the policemen started deserting their posts, and a sizeable section of the Kashmir Armed Police surrounded the office of the Director-General, shouting derogatory slogans and calling for 'blood for blood'. It was a near mutiny. The conspiracy was to bring about total mutiny on the eve of January 26 or on January 26 itself. The foreign journalists also reached the spot and attempted to record the slogans on their tapes. But we did not lose nerve. I quickly deputed Adviser Qureshi to the office of the Director-General to take 'holding action' by initiating some sort of a dialogue with the policemen and suggesting that those who had grievances could even meet the Governor. In the meanwhile, a contingent of the Army was brought near the place of trouble tp convey the impression to the trouble-makers that the Administration would act quickly to disarm the J&K Armed Police. Simultaneously, the Central Reserve Police personnel were dispatched to the police station. This had a lightning effect and the design of the conspirators and subversives were frustrated.
     On the evening of January 24, I was informed by Divisional Commissioner Jalil Khan that Akali leader Simranjit Singh Mann had come to the State Guest House and that he wanted accommodation for him as well as a retinue of his armed bodyguards. Accommodation, of course, had to be given. It was a matter of courtesy. Jalil also informed me that Mann wanted to meet me. Mann had not given prior information to anyone, nor was any intelligence agency able to inform me about his intended arrival. Such was the state of the intelligence machinery. I was totally surprised by Mann's arrival.
     Why should Mann arrive at Srinagar unannounced? What was the purpose of his mission? While I was weighing all these misgivings in my mind and discussing them with the officers concerned, Inspector-General of Police (CID), Amar Kapoor, rang me up to say that Mann had met a number of foreign journalists at Broadway Hotel and told them that he wanted the State Government not to enact a second 'Blue Star'. This statement added to the mystery of Mann's visit.
     About the same time, information was received that Dr. Farooq Abdullah was coming to Srinagar from Jammu, and that he wanted certain facilities at the airport as well as at his house. These facilities had to be given. But there were no apparent compulsions for him to come at that time and in the circumstances then prevailing. Did he not realise that his presence would merely cause further strain on the security apparatus? Or was his purpose different? Why did he choose this moment? Why did he not come earlier? In fact, the accusation against him was that, when in office, he had securely cushioned himself at Jammu. 
     Simranjit Singh Mann came to see me the following morning. His talk with me was somewhat patchy and disoriented. As Mann was talking to me, an urgent wireless message came. Four IAF officers, including Squadron Leaders Ravi Khanna, had been shot dead by the militants, while they were waiting at Rawalpura bus stand for their vehicle to pick them up. This ghastly crime shocked me. I picked up the phone and issued instructions for a vigorous search of the area. Mann's instant advice was that I should not order searches. "It would serve useful purpose', he said.
     After another five minutes, Mann left. He told me that he was going back to Punjab via the rest-house where he was staying. Before leaving, he made a statement to the press that he had advised the Governor to ensure that no 'Blue Star' was enacted in Srinagar. He did not refer to the ex-pression 'Blue Star' in his talk with me. Why did he mention this is his press statement? Was it a slip or something else? Was he aware of the huge crowd being collected at the Idgah on January 26? If this purpose was to make a statement to the press after speaking to me, why could he not do so after contacting me on the phone from Chandigarh or Amritsar?
     By that time, however, I had more or less decided about the strategy for January 26. Bit I kept my thinking close to my chest. If I gave any premature indication, I thought, it might be divulged to the militants and they might change the plan and create more serious problems.
     Late in the evening of January 25, I made it known to a few of my close aides that I would not be going to the winter capital, Jammu, to take the Republic Day salute. The risk of leaving the city of Srinagar was too great. Anything could happen. I had to be there to take quick decisions, to meet an unforeseen situation, or modify our strategy if the militants changed their operational plan at the eleventh hour.
     With the brutal killings of four IAF officers and sudden visits of Mann and Dr. Farooq, new tensions, new suspicious had arisen. The Air Force was shocked and angry. The airmen had questions in their eyes: "Was it to see our brave officers being killed like pigeons in treacherous attacks that we undertook 704 hazardous sorties from October 27 to November 17, 1947, to save Kashmir Valley from the revages of the raiders? Would this be the end-result of Major-General Thimayya's historic action of taking tanks to snow-covered Zojila Pass at the height of 11,578 feet or that of the amazing feet or that of the amazing feat of Air Commodore Mehan Singh who flew his plane to 23,000 feet above the sea level without oxygen in the hitherto uncharted course and landing at a hastily laid rough airstrip at the height of 11,500 feet?"
     I went to the Air Force colony along with Lt.-General Zaki, met senior officers, and personally consoled the bereaved families. Mrs. Khanna, the young widow of Squadron Leader Khanna, struck me as unusually courageous and gently. Her tragedy was immense, and it was writ large on her pale face. But she did not utter a singly word against either Muslim or Kashmiris. Her only appeal to me was to ensure that other families were not struck with such tragedies. Lt-Genral Zaki and I also went to the military hospital to see the injured airmen.
     The tragic incident of brutal murder of the four IAF officials also confirmed the impression that a sizable section of the police had been inflitrated or had come to the conclusion that the militants at that time had acquired so much ascendancy that it would be expedient to help-indirectly, if not directly-by inaction, if not by active collaboration. The Adviser, Qureshi, whom o requested to make an on-the-spot inquiry immediately after the killing took place, reported:
     "The Rawalpora shooting incident of January 25, 1990, wherein Squadron Leader R.K. Khanna and three others were killed and ten injured by the extremists, at about 0730 hours in the morning, is a result of absolute lack of pluck and failure, at the operational level, manifest from the lack of action of the Jammu and Kashmir Armed Police outpost located within a stone's throw of the three places where the actual shooting took place. Altogether about 40 rounds were fired by the extremists, apparently from 2 to 3 automatic weapons and one SA pistol. The assailants drove up to the victims in a two-wheeler Honda and a Maruti Gypsy and, after accomplishing their task, took a clockwise circuit of the roundabout and vanished towards the bypass. The Jammu and Kashmir Armed Police post, located near the place of occurrence in a pucca buildings, had one head constable and 7 constables with 8 x 303 rifles with 50 rounds of ammunition per rifle and had, at the precise time of the occurrence, 5 men including the head constable present. They did not react."
     To frustrate the overall strategy of the militants and to hit their operational plan at its roots, I had already decided to impose curfew from January 25 afternoon and to enforce it strictly, even in lanes and by-lanes. The underlying objective was to prevent the crowd from gathering. I was certain that, once the crowd gathered at the Idgah, then situations like those of Blue Star and Tienanmen Square could not be prevented. Frenzied speeches would be made to incite the crowd and the cry of 'Jihad' and independence would be raised in the name of Islam. The armed militants would assure the crowd that they would hit back if the police or the army moved in. The mass of people could just sit down and challenge the army and paramilitary forces to do what they liked.
     One thing for which the militants were not fully prepared was the imposition of strict curfew. They believed that it would be unthinkable to impose curfew on the Republic Day, and even if curfew was imposed, it would be impossible to enforce it. But the strategy of posting the police and paramilitary forces at street corners, that is, at the very point from where rivulets were to flow and join other rivulets to form a torrent, upset the calculation of the subversives and their supporters.
     The Administration meant business. People got the message. Loudspeakers did blare out, exhorting the people to come out. But this had little impact. Psychologically, the position had changed. Militants could no longer be taken as sport. For any subversive venture the price had to be paid.
     This was our first major victory on the physical as well as psychological front. The torrent had not been allowed to be formed. The rivulets had been dyked near their point of origin.
     For the night, I had taken special measures to illuminate Government buildings and also to have streetlights burning. The militants has 'issued instructions to the people' to observe blackout and not to permit illumination of any buildings or burning of streetlights. They had threatened to blow up the powerhouse and electric substations. But they could not succeed in any of these designs.
     In the evening, I came out of my office to have a look at the city. Most of the lights were on. The streetlights were burning brightly. The government buildings were illuminated. Srinagar, in fact, as never so well lighted as it was on that night. For the sake of records, I got some of the important localities photographed. I felt as if a new candle of light, of hope, had started burning within me. My instructions of the Power Department, the Srinagar Municipality, the Police, the P.W.D. and various other public bodies had been obeyed. Respect for authority, call it fear if you like, had started having its impact.
     I contrasted this phenomenon with the blackouts of the earlier Republic Days and Independence Days, when the so-called popular Governments were in power. What used to upset me most in this regard was that the miscreants indulged in the blackouts for fun, for sport, for securing some sort of mischievous thrill and the Governments of the time took everything light-heartedly. Even some of the functionaries of the administration derived secret pleasure out of these events. Consequently, over the years, it became second nature with most of the youth to indulge in the business of embarrassing pro-India force and secure wide publicity in the process. Tolerance was mistaken for cowardice, non-action for acquiescence, and the administration's blind eye for a wink of encouragement. This is how habits are formed. The attitude of taking the authorities lightly struck deep roots.

(to be continued..)